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JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES IN SITUATIONS 
OF UNAVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY: A REPLY 
TO PROFESSOR FERZAN 
I. THE INSIGHT: ONE MAY HAVE TO SPECULATE AS TO SOME 
FACTS RELEVANT TO WHETHER CONDUCT IS JUSTIFIED 
Professor Ferzan's paper highlights an important insight 
regarding self-defense: that the operation of the defense is 
inevitably speculative. The actor cannot know with certainty 
what in fact will happen if she does or does not act; she can only 
act with regard to the facts as she knows them. But this aspect 
of Professor Ferzan's insight only restates the obvious reason 
for having a mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse (MAJ): in 
order to insure that an actor's blameworthiness is ultimately 
judged by the culpability, if any, inherent in the decision she 
makes. The MAJ doctrine is similar in operation to the oper­
ation of culpability requirements in offense definitions: the 
objective elements may define the prohibited conduct, but lia­
bility does not follow upon that showing alone but only upon a 
showing of culpability as to those objective elements. 
But Professor Ferzan's insight goes further, and has special 
implications for self-defense: even for the adjudicator, self-defense 
is necessarily a speculative business. That is, even in a �vorld of 
perfect evidence gathering and event reconstruction, the decision­
maker cannot know the facts needed to determine with certainty 
the essential elements of self-defense, such as whether the force 
used was really necessary to prevent an attack. For example, 
* I would like to thank the organizers of the conference, chief among 
them Professor Ferzan, for their efforts in convening such an interesting and 
useful forum. 
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when the hostage acts upon an opportunity on Tuesday to kill the 
kidnapper who has threatened death at the end of the week, we 
can never know whether the kidnapper would have changed his 
mind, making the killing unnecessary. 
This distinguishes the self-defense situation from the offense 
definition situation: an effective fact-finding tribunal typically 
can determine with some certainty whether the objective offense 
elements are satisfied, that is, whether an injury was caused, 
whether a partner was underage, whether the property belonged 
to another, etc. But the same tribunal can only speculate about 
whether the objective elements of self-defense existed. 
It may be true that this typically is not a problem of practical 
significance. Complete and absolute certainly may not be pos­
sible but the actual level of uncertainty typically is trivial. An 
angry attacker is swinging her arm to stab you in the chest. It is 
conceivable that, for reasons unknown, she might change her 
mind in the next moment, but such an event would be quite rare 
in the course of human events. We tend not to take seriously 
the purely theoretical existence of uncertainty. But there are a 
few scenarios where the uncertainty cannot be ignored, as is the 
case with the abductor who threatens to kill at the end of the 
week. While it may not be likely, it is in fact conceivable that 
something - a change of mind, intervention by police, etc. -
may intervene to avoid the need for the killing by the hostage. 
II. DOES THE INSIGHT MEAN THAT JUSTIFICATIONS MUST 
NECESSARILY BE SUBJECTIVE? 
From her insight, Professor Ferzan draws the conclusion that 
self-defense is necessarily, unavoidably subjective and, there­
fore, that we must jettison the objective 'deeds' theory of jus­
tification in favor of the subjective 'reasons' theory. 
I admire the insight but disagree with the conclusion. 
Professor Ferzan's insight leads to her conclusion along this 
simple path: 
if the actor cannot know the actual future, her blamewor­
thiness can only be judged by the culpability of her belief, that 
is, judged by the reasonableness of her prediction of the future 
that she cannot know. To judge her otherwise for example, 
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according to purely objective criteria - is unjust both because 
she cannot know the facts and, worse, even the adjudicator 
cannot know the facts. The only available criteria by which her 
blameworthiness can fairly and feasibly be judged is subjective. 
I agree with this entire line of reasoning. My point is only 
that it has nothing to do with the objective 'deeds' theory of 
justification and its advantages over a subjective "reasons" 
theory (that is, the advantages of segregating the issue of 
objective justification from the issue of MAJ). 
Professor Ferzan appears to begin with an assumption that 
the purpose of the justification defense is to assess the actor's 
blameworthiness. At one point she notes, for example: "The 
deeds theorist must grant Harry the right to act at a time of 
uncertainty, while simultaneously condemning him if he guesses 
wrong."1 At another point she complains that the objective 
view is "unfair to ... agents."2 
But as I have argued in Structure & Function,3 I think the 
justification defense is better formulated to serve a different 
function than the adjudication-of-blameworthiness function 
that she assumes it must have. I suggest that it is best seen as 
serving the ex ante function of announcing the rules of (future) 
conduct, rather than as serving the ex post adjudication func­
tion, which I think is more than adequately served in this 
context by the MAJ excuse. But having started with the 
assumption that the justification defense serves the blamewor­
thiness-adjudication function, Professor Ferzan then shows, 
persuasively and conclusively, that the objective formulation 
has problems and that the subjective formulation must be used. 
The move is analogous, I suggest, to that in Kent Greenawalt's 
well-known piece in which he misconceives justification 
defenses to include the MAJ excuse then, not surprisingly, finds 
the borders of justification and excuse to be "perplexing. "4 
1 [p. 719]. 
2 [p. 719]. 
3 Paul H. Robinson, 'Structure and Function in Criminal Law' 105-123 
(1997). 
4 Kent Greenawalt,' The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse', 84 
Columbia Law Review 144 (1984). 
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Of course, Professor Ferzan is not alone in her assumption 
that justification defenses must be seen as adjudicators of 
blameworthiness. I am no scholar of the philosophy literature 
but my limited exposure suggests to me that this is the 
well-worn standard line. I don't think most such scholars even 
see an issue on a matter on which I think they are wrong, so I 
must ask myself why so much difficulty on this point? Why is 
this assumption that justification defenses must be about 
blameworthiness assessment - so hard to think differently 
about? 
I don't have an answer, but here is a bit of very raw spec­
ulation, which touches on the distinction between philosophers 
and lawyers: most philosophers (but not a115) seem to see 
criminal law doctrines as independent pieces, each of which 
they take to be a test of blameworthiness in a particular set of 
cases: self-defense cases, omission cases, complicity cases, cau­
sation cases, attempt cases. Lawyers- at least modern lawyers 
see the criminal code as a whole as being the only entity that 
addresses the ultimate issue of blameworthiness; all of the 
provisions in the code are just cogs in the larger machine, each 
cog doing its small part toward the ultimate determination. 
Certainly some of the cogs seem to come close to dealing 
with the ultimate blameworthiness issue - offense culpability 
requirements and excuse defenses in particular are of this sort -
but even this perception is an illusion. Note that culpability 
requirements and excuse defenses are different from one 
another, in other words they are different cogs performing 
different functions toward the ultimate end. And even these two 
cogs only pick up where dozens of other cogs have left off. The 
cogs defining prohibited conduct, causation, complicity, etc 
have already done their work, or soon will. The notion that 
justification defenses must be formulated to make a blame­
worthiness assessment simply misconceives how modern crim­
inal law works. (Of course, legal philosophers are free to make 
up any conceptualizations they wish, even those that bear no 
relation to the structure and practical challenges facing law, but 
5 Michael Moore does not seem to take this view, and there may well be 
others. 
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then they ought not make claims that their conclusions have 
meaning for law and they ought not criticize existing law based 
upon their conceptualizations). 
My specific point here is that justification defenses need have 
no more to do with an ultimate blameworthiness assessment 
than do the objective requirements of offense definitions- indeed 
the two are similar in that both set the rules of conduct for future 
action. We do not conclude that the objective requirements are 
somehow immoral because they ignore blameworthiness; we 
know they will be modified by a host of other doctrines in the 
blameworthiness machine, including the offense culpability 
requirements. We can have the same assurance with regard to an 
objective justification defense: it serves its purpose of setting the 
rules for (future) conduct, but is only one cog in the blamewor­
thiness machine; the results of the justification defenses will be 
cranked though other provisions, including the MAJ rules. 6 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "INEVITABLY-SPECULATIVE" 
INSIGHT FOR AN OBJECTIVE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION 
Let me return to Professor Ferzan's "inevitably-speculative" 
insight about justification situations. If Professor Ferzan had 
conceived of the 'deeds' theory of justification as serving a rule­
articulation function, rather than an adjudication function, her 
insight might have let her to put this criticism: while it may be 
irrelevant to the "deeds" theory that this actor and the adju­
dicator both must speculate about what would have happened 
if this actor had not used her defensive force, the inevitably­
speculative nature of self-defense does create a problem for the 
rule-articulation function. Specifically, should not an effective 
set of conduct rules tell future actors what risks they can and 
cannot take in the face of the unavoidable uncertainty that 
6 The better analogy here might be of two machines: the rule-articulation 
machine whose cogs are the doctrines that serve the rule-articulation func­
tion, standing next to and feeding its output into the blameworthiness­
adjudication machine. The first requirement for blame is a violation of the 
rules of conduct; then followed by a determination as to whether that vio­
lation deserves punishment. I have identified which criminal law doctrines 
serve which function in Structure & Function, 138-142. 
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some self-defense situations may present? Should not the rules 
of conduct give the imprisoned hostage some guidance as to 
when she can kill the abductor who threatens death at the end 
of the week? 
I would answer: Yes, such guidance would be useful. Thus, I 
must ask how justification's rules of conduct should take 
account of the inevitably-speculative nature of some facts rel­
evant to justification? That is a fair question, which I will ad­
dress, but before doing so let me note a preliminary point. 
The issue that the inevitably-speculative point raises here is 
not one that involves the objective vs subjective justification dis­
pute. The risk to be defined here is not the ex post adjudication 
of risk-taking by which blameworthiness is judged. It is not a 
"subjective" issue at all, taking "subjective" to refer to some 
particular actor's actual awareness of risk in her mind at some 
given moment. Rather, the issue is one of the ex ante objective 
definition of prohibited risks. That is, it involves defining in 
objective terms for all actors a rule to guide future actors in self­
defense situations. It has nothing to do with a particular actor's 
subjective awareness of risk and everything to do with society's 
balance of competing interests. How much should society value 
the certain loss of life of the abductor as against the risk of 
death of the hostage? Where on the continuum of risk is the 
point beyond which a self-defender cannot go? Thus, there is 
nothing in the "inevitably-speculative" insight that undercuts 
an objective theory of justification. 
It is true that the objective theory must deal with an 
uncertainty, specifically our inability to know at the moment 
of action what the world would be like in the case of inaction. 
One could even say that this uncertainty means that there 
exists at the moment of decision a "risk." But as I have 
argued elsewhere, 7 there is a difference between a particular 
actor's subjective risk-taking and the existence of objective ex 
ante uncertainties. In deciding what to do when facing an 
uncertainty, a specific actor may engage in subjective risk-
7 Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or In­
atteractiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk­
Creation Offenses, 4 Theoretical Inquires in Law 367 (2002). 
JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES IN UNAVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY 781 
taking, something that is highly relevant - but only to criminal 
law's adjudication function, and in particular to assessing the 
MAJ excuse. The objective justification defense is interested 
only in the ex ante objective risk, from the perspective of what 
is knowable and not from the perspective of what a particular 
actor knows. (Again, there is no need to define justification 
defenses to hinge upon what a particular actor "believes.") 
Now to the question of what the rules of conduct should say 
as guidance to future actors about the inevitable uncertainty 
that could exist in a self-defense situation. What guidance can 
the law give? 
Notice first that the criminal law's rule of conduct must be just 
that: a legal rule of conduct, not a particular statement of dis­
position like "give this hostage a defense." Similarly, the rule 
must have some breadth; it cannot be a special rule for the hos­
tages-threatened-with-death-at-the-end-of-the-week-who-have­
a-chance-to-kill-on-Tuesday cases. If the rule-of-conduct 
function is to be served, the rule must be stated in a form that will 
give guidance in the infinite variety of situations in which self­
defense may arise. And this necessarily presents real limitations 
on what the rule should and can say. 
This point may help explain the seemingly inevitable awk­
wardness in conversations between those who support an 
objective theory of justification because such a formulation best 
serves the rules-of-conduct function and those who support an 
objective theory because it "reflects some greater truth about 
the nature of justifications." The latter group really do care 
about resolving every bizarre hypothetical that the ingenious 
professorial mind can create. The former group "group" here 
being used in a somewhat grandiose manner to refer to what I 
fear may be a count of I finds such exercises irrelevant, 
entertaining, or hilarious, depending upon the immediate his­
tory of alcoholic intake. I can probably develop an answer in 
each bizarre case as to how, if I were dictator of the world, I 
would balance the interests in conflict and, therefore, as to 
whether I would judge conduct in the hypothesized case as 
justified, but such analyses have little to do with how justifi­
cation defenses in law should be formulated. This is the dif­
ference between being interested in philosophy for what it can 
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do to improve law and being interested in philosophy for its 
own sake. 
Most philosophers even those who are law professors -
don't seem to care about how the legal rule is formulated, 
thinking such matters off the point (Recall Mitch Berman's 
refusal to answer my simple question about whether he thought 
the "believes" language should be included in a justification 
defense). On the other hand, we in the "group" who see justi­
fication defenses as articulation of the rules of conduct don't 
care much about matters other than formulation issues; the 
theorizing is important only for what it tells us about proper 
formulation. With those seemingly mutually exclusive areas of 
interest, engaged conversation tends either to be short or to be 
long and awkward. 
One further point regarding how rules of conduct should 
take account of the self-defense inevitable-uncertainty problem: 
the rule-articulation function must face the realities of the 
world. I don't want to make too much of this; the law ought to 
strive for the ideal, even if it is not always attainable. But it 
ought not overreach, because doing so can undermine its goal 
of effectively conveying rules of conduct Self-defense rules are 
already highly unrealistic about what guidance the rules of 
conduct can provide to the self-defender. To illustrate with one 
small piece of the standard self-defense rules: one can use force 
to defend against an unjustified attack, but not deadly force, 
unless threatened with serious bodily injury, in which case one 
can use deadly force, unless one can safely retreat, unless one is 
in one's own place of work, unless it is also the attacker's place 
of work. It is quite silly for the law to think that these conduct 
rules really could be used to guide a self-defender's conduct. 
Their effect may be more likely to obscure the guidance that 
might well be conveyed. (Such detailed rules might be useful to 
increase uniformity in adjudication, which is why have urged a 
separate code of code and a code of adjudication, so the former 
does not get obscured by the latter. 8) 
What guidance is realistic to expect the law to give with 
regard to the society's balance of interests arising from the 
8 Structure & Function, 185-209. 
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uncertainty of self-defense, such as the proper balance between 
apparently certain death of the abductor (if the hostage kills 
now) as against a risk of death for the hostage (if the hostage 
delays killing)? 
This is a hugely complicated calculation. In practice, I think 
the law does now by way of guidance most of what I think it is 
realistic for it to do: it tells the hostage that the use of defensive 
force must be "necessary," which has a temporal aspect (as well 
as its amount-of-force aspect). Indeed, it does more; in the 
context of self-defense, it tells the actor that the force must be 
"immediately necessary," thereby emphasizing the temporal 
aspect. What more could we realistically expect it to do? Per­
haps there are some good suggestions out there. I would be 
interested to hear them. 9 
But even if more guidance were possible, I think it doubtful 
that the law should aim to provide guidance in the kind of 
bizarre professorial hypotheticals that dominate this area. 
These hypotheticals by their nature are the cases in which the 
balance of competing interests and the justified nature of the 
conduct is at its most ambiguous - that is the point in the 
construction of the hypothetical. (That is similarly the point of 
Professor Ferzan's highlighting the inevitably-speculative point 
and the situations in which it can become significant.) But all 
these cases, upon which the professors are so focused, are just 
the cases that are least useful in serving the rules-of-conduct 
education function. They are the last cases that a legal system 
would want to use as vehicles to convey the rules of conduct. (It 
would be like using the special relativity principle to teach 
introductory principles of physics. The former is of interest 
specifically because it seems inconsistent with the rules of the 
latter.) 
To conclude, Professor Ferzan's insight regarding the inev­
itable uncertainty of some facts relevant to justification is to my 
9 The definition of acceptable and of prohibited risk in the justification 
situation is little different from the same challenge in the offense definition 
situation, in which the law seeks to give people guidance as to the kind of 
apparent risks that are forbidden. But in that latter context, there is room for 
improvement and I have made some specific suggestions. See Structure & 
Function, 148-153. 
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mind most interesting, but I can see no reason why that 
uncertainty should cause anyone to reject the objective theory 
of justification in favor of a subjective theory. Yes, the deeds 
theory ideally ought to give actors as much guidance as is 
feasible in conforming to society's rules of conduct, and the 
inevitably-speculative insight shows just how challenging that 
task can be. But there is nothing in the insight that suggests any 
advantage to defining justification defenses not as objective 
inquiries but as focusing upon whether a particular actor 
"believes " certain facts at a certain moment. That subjective 
formulation of justification creates a long list of serious 
difficulties that I have recounted elsewhere, 10 and nothing in 
Professor Ferzan's insight either eliminates those difficulties or 
gives reason to suffer them. 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
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10 Structure & Function, 105-123. 
